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Arianna Betti 
SEMPITERNAL TRUTH. 
THE BOLZANO-TWARDOWSKI-LE NIEWSKI AXIS* 
1. Introduction 
In 1913 Stanis aw Le niewski published his article on the sempiternity of 
truth, “Is Truth Only Eternal or Is It both Eternal and Sempiternal?” 
(Le niewski 1913a).1 The paper, directed against Kotarbi ski’s “The 
Problem of the Existence of the Future” (Kotarbi ski 1913), made an 
important contribution to the debate on the excluded middle current in 
the Lvov circle in those years.2 The discussion involved at the same time 
absoluteness, eternity and sempiternity of truth, i.e. truth for ever and 
truth since ever, and had as ideal reference point Twardowski’s “On the 
So-Called Relative Truths” (1900),3 where the founder of the Lvov-
Warsaw School had attacked the relativity of truth. Contrasting 
Kotarbi ski’s positions, Le niewski defended “absolutism,” consequently 
                                                             
* This paper was submitted in 1996. Until now versions of it have circulated in various 
forms. A Polish translation of it appeared in Filozofia Nauki, VI, Nr. 2 (22), 1998, 
pp. 51-75. Having done much more work on the subject in the meantime, I have added in 
proof the changes which allow this paper to appear in print. The present version is to be 
considered the final and official one. 
1 Warning: the English translation contains mistakes which alter the text, especially at 
p. 109. 
2 To the discussion belonged also Le niewski (1913b). 
3 See Twardowski (1900), labeled henceforth in the text Relative Truths. I should warn 
the reader that the German translation of the latter omits some parts of the text. See infra, 
nn. 39, 45. This paper and Twardowski (1911) have finally a good translation by Arthur 
Szylewicz in Kazimierz Twardowski – On Actions, Products and other Topics in 
Philosophy, J. Brandl and J. Wole ski (eds.), Rodopi, Atlanta/Amsterdam, 1999, resp. 
pp. 147-168 and 103-132. 
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taking sides with Twardowski.4 Twardowski had revived Bernard 
Bolzano’s ideas on the subject, and, mainly thanks to him, these became 
known in the Lvov-Warsaw School (see, for instance, Jadacki 1993, 
p. 191). There is no doubt that Le niewski knew Twardowski’s ideas and 
it seems evident that the latter influenced him: Le niewski’s results are 
mostly compatible with the “absolutistic” content of Twardowski’s 1900 
article. And, similarly, no doubts can be raised about the Bolzanian 
origin of the aspects of eternity and sempiternity of truth defended by 
Twardowski in Relative Truths (see, for instance, Wole ski and Simons 
1988, p. 430, n. 24; and Simons 1992, Ch. 2, p. 15, n. 11; see also Smith 
1988, p. 325): though his name is not quoted, traces of Bolzano’s legacy 
can be found even in the examples given by Twardowski, some of which 
are the same as used by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre.5 Yet, since 
Bolzano, Twardowski and Le niewski supported different theories of 
meaning with different ontological presuppositions, “sempiternity of 
truth” actually stands for three different conceptions. This paper is a 
survey of these three conceptions. I suggested elsewhere a comparison 
between Bolzano and the early Le niewski as to their theories of meaning 
and truth, claiming the possibility of a (direct or indirect) influence of 
Bolzano upon Le niewski. The analysis presented here is also meant as a 
contribution to the picture sketched there.6 
                                                             
4 Twardowski himself seems to have attacked Kotarbi ski, see Wole ski (1990a), p. 194. 
The latter contains also a discussion of the Le niewski-Kotarbi ski controversy. 
5 One of them is “The fragrance of this flower is pleasant,” see Twardowski (1900, p. 316 
[Germ. transl., p. 416]), see also Bolzano WL §147. The parallel is quoted also by Peter 
Simons. The German translation, however – both at pp. 416 and 438 – has not “diese 
Blume riecht angenehm” as reported in Simons (1992, p. 15 n. 11), but “der Duft dieser 
Blume ist angenehm.” See also the discussion of the demonstrative ‘ten’ (this), 
Twardowski (1900, p. 323 [Germ. transl., p. 428]). See also Bolzano (1972), pp. 75-76 
and 193-197 [WL §59 and §147]. 
6 See Betti (1998b). I should remark that the Austro-Polish tradition of absolutistic 
theories of truth – eternity and sempiternity aside – has its roots also in the school of 
Franz Brentano, Twardowski’s teacher. See most of all Wole ski and Simons (1989). See 
also the volume Albertazzi, Libardi and Poli (1996). 
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2. Bernard Bolzano in the Wissenschaftslehre (1837) 
In Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre truth-bearers are propositions-in-
themselves, or simply propositions. They are objects with the following 
features7: 
 they are non-existing objects, that is they do not enter into the 
causal chain, nor do they exist in any time or place, but subsist in 
the universe as a certain something (for such objects I will employ 
henceforth the label “lektological”) (see Bolzano 1972, p. 21 
[WL §19]); 
 they are the matter or content of mental  acts as well as the sense 
or the meaning in a restricted sense of linguistic expressions8 and 
they subsist independently of their being thought or expressed 
linguistically; mental acts and linguistic expressions, which are 
real, do exist; 
 they are complex objects, composed of parts called ideas-in-
themselves; ideas may refer to objects; as a result of the fact that 
an idea may refer to one, or more than one object or not refer at 
all, it is singular objectual, common objectual or non-objectual 
(empty). Objects may be subdivided into qualities (of which 
relations are a special kind), i.e. any object that belongs to at least 
one other object, and pure objects, objects which are not qualities. 
Every quality is an object, while not every object is a quality; 
 they have always the form ‘a has (b)-ity’ where ‘a’ is an idea, 
‘(b)-ity’ is an idea (of quality), and moreover, also ‘has’ is an 
idea.9 
Now, given the ideas ‘a’, ‘has’, ‘(b)-ity’, the proposition ‘a has (b)-ity’ is 
true if and only if 
 
                                                             
7 I shall consider briefly only those elements which are essential to the discussion. See 
Casari’s papers in the references for a more exhaustive picture of Bolzano’s views, and 
the indispensable Berg (1962). 
8 Note that the relation between linguistic expressions and propositions-in-themselves is 
here oversimplified, as no sentence expresses a proposition directly, but via an idea of 
that proposition. 
9 The issue is connected with the so-called “Bolzano’s Conjecture,” see Casari (1992), 
p. 75. As it is by now common in Bolzano scholarship, I will employ expressions 
surrounded by square brackets to designate lektological objects. 
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B1 ‘a’ is non-empty;  
B2 ‘(b)-ity’ is an idea of quality (and is non-empty); 
B3 At least one of the qualities which ‘(b)-ity’ refers to belongs to any 
object which ‘a’ refers to.10 
 While in Bolzano truth-bearers are propositions, truth-makers are the 
relationships (Verhältnisse) that a proposition enunciates, where a 
relationship is the belonging of a quality (which ‘(b)-ity’ refers to) to an 
object (which ‘a’ refers to).11 A true proposition-in-itself is called a 
truth-in-itself (see Bolzano 1972, p. 32 [WL §25]).12 Truths are objective: 
The number of blossoms that were on a certain tree last spring is a 
statable, if unknown, figure. Thus, the proposition which states this figure 
I call an objective truth, even if nobody knows it. (Bolzano 1972, p. 32 
[WL §25]) 
Any proposition is either true or false, always and everywhere (see 
Bolzano 1972, p. 172 [WL §125]). Bolzano’s position may be summed 
up in the following statement (which holds also for falsity): 
(B) For any proposition-in-itself p, if p is true at a time t, then it is true 
also at an arbitrary time t1 past or future with respect to t.13 
Consequently, when it is said that a proposition is neither true nor false, 
it is not a proposition-in-itself which is meant, but a linguistic 
expression: 
                                                             
10 See Casari (1992), pp. 73-75. See also Bolzano WL §28, §131, §196. For B2, which, 
however, may be derived as a theorem, see, for instance, Bolzano (1972), p. 121 
[WL §80, 2]. 
11 See most of all the dense Casari’s (1992) Appendix on the “still open” semantic value 
of propositions. I propose a different interpretation in my “Bolzano’s Universe: 
Metaphysics, Logic and Truth,” which is to appear in L. Haaparanta & H.J. Koskinen 
(eds.), Categories of Being (Oxford University Press). 
12 English translations from the Wissenschaftslehre are from Bolzano (1972), unless 
otherwise indicated. 
13 The apparent oddity of saying that an atemporal truth-bearer ‘is true in t’ requires 
additional explanation, which I cannot satisfactorily give here. The issue involves a 
discussion of the thesis: (AT) atemporal truth does not follow from atemporal truth-
bearers. Since truth is a relational quality (B1-B3) of a proposition, it does not follow 
only from the atemporal status of the latter that truth is atemporal. This means also that to 
be a ‘sempiternalist’ you do not need such truth-bearers, as clear from Twardowski’s and 
Le niewski’s position. See also Simons (1991; 1994). There could be several ways to 
better reformulate (B) by taking (AT) into account. 
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What is meant is that this linguistic expression admits one interpretation 
on which it has a true sense and another on which it has a false sense, or 
that it is so indefinite that we do not find ourselves justified in either the 
one or the other of these interpretations. (Bolzano 1973, p. 169 [§125]) 
Discussing some fundamental logical laws, like   , Bolzano claims 
that while affirming “if an object has a certain property, then it has such 
a property” it is not necessary to add “at the same time.” Some 
propositions state instead a merely transient relationship, linguistically 
expressed by sentences like, for instance, “it is raining.” In order to 
completely express a truth, such sentences require the addition of a time 
determination and of a location, such as “on August 18, 1996, in Leiden, 
The Netherlands, it is raining.”14 This follows from the fact that for 
Bolzano any real thing – with the possible exception of God – is located 
in time (see Bolzano 1972, p. 110 [WL §79, 5]). If we want to say, then, 
that a quality truly belongs to some real object, we must always specify 
the time in which the quality belongs to the object, and 
this is of such universal validity that we may even say of the attributes of 
God that they belong to Him at a certain time, namely at all times. (see 
Bolzano 1972, p. 32 [WL §25])15 
Hence no sentence of the form “The real object A has (the attribute) b” 
expresses a complete truth, unless we include in the idea-subject a 
temporal specification. For according to Bolzano, 
the time in which we may truly attribute a certain property to an object 
belongs to the idea of the object, and not to the idea of the copula of the 
proposition. (Bolzano 1972, pp. 57-58 [WL §45]) 
Any time-indication pertains thus to the subject-idea of the proposition. 
The sentence “Caius is now learned” is not to be looked at as if it 
expressed a proposition in which the part corresponding to (a de-
indexicalized) “now” belonged to the copula, because the temporal 
determination belongs to the subject. A more correct expression would 
then be 
                                                             
14 “And so I hope no one will take it seriously that the truth or falsity of propositions is a 
property of them that varies with time and place” (Bolzano 1973, p. 169 [WL §125]). 
15 For Bolzano God is one of the real objects, which in the causal chain all undergo the 
effects of external causes. Yet, being placed at the beginning of the causal chain, God is 
not subject to any effect, causa prima. See, for instance, Bolzano (1972), p. 248 
[WL §168]. 
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(1) “Caius in his present state is learned” (or: “the present Caius is 
learned”). 
Sentence (1) and the sentence 
(2) “Caius was ignorant ten years ago,” 
therefore, express propositions which have different subjects. The 
propositions respectively expressed by (1) and (2) are the following: 
(1*) [Caius2006 has learnedness] 
(2*) [Caius1996 has ignorance] (see Bolzano 1972, pp. 57-58 [WL §45]). 
The sentence 
(3) “I have a sensation of pain” 
does not completely express a true proposition unless we transform it 
(with the proviso that it is uttered by Kurt Weill on April 3, 1950 at 
00.01) into 
(4) “Kurt Weill, on April 3, 1950 at 00.01, has a sensation of pain.” 
Thus if times – conceived of as particular determinations of real objects – 
are different, many contradictory attributes may be attributed to the same 
thing. Propositions with predicate-ideas contradicting each other may be 
true if and only if their subject-ideas are different, so if two contradictory 
qualities (as for instance ignorance and learnedness) are correctly 
asserted of the same substance (i.e. for Bolzano an existing or real 
object), it follows that two different time specifications are present in 
that substance. Bolzano has a reason for not attaching the time 
determination to predicates: any quality is a determination, but the 
converse does not hold (see Bolzano 1972, pp. 121-122 [WL §80]). Time 
(and space) determinations are among those which are not qualities: 
Not all determinations of objects require a predicate idea in a proposition 
where this object is the subject. Rather, there are ideas that serve as 
determinations of objects without being attributes of them. These ideas 
have the peculiarity that they can never occur in the place of the predicate 
idea (b) but only as parts of the subject idea (A) itself. Of this sort are 
especially the determinations of time and space of existing things, 
because the time in which the existing thing is located and during which 
certain attributes can in truth be attributed to it is not an attribute of this 
thing. For this reason the idea of this time does not occur in the predicate, 
but in the subject idea of the proposition. This holds analogously also of 
the spatial determinations of things. (Bolzano 1972, pp. 121-122 [WL 
§80]) 
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When speaking of the “Parts which the Author Takes all Propositions to 
Have” (§127), Bolzano says that language allows us to express through 
the copula of the canonical form of propositions [A has b] not only 
person and number of the subject, but also time determinations. But since 
language connection is not an essential connection, from this we cannot 
conclude, as Bolzano has already said in §45 and §79, that the copula 
‘has’ is formed also by the determination of a time at which something is 
had (see Bolzano 1972, p. 177 [WL §127, 5]).16 There are cases in which 
this is particularly evident: Bolzano says that it seems that the 
proposition ‘Every truth has an object with which it deals’ says that the 
belonging of such-and-such a quality to truths takes place at the present 
time, even if truths are objects which are not in time at all. But if the 
parts of the proposition expressed by “the object A – has at time t – the 
attribute b” are to be clearly indicated, they must be expressed in the 
following way: “the object A at time t – has – (the attribute) b.” 
For it does not happen at time t that the attribute b is claimed for the 
object A; but the object A, inasmuch as it is thought to exist at time t 
(hence to have this determination) is claimed to have the attribute b. 
(Bolzano 1972, p. 177 [WL §127, 5]) 
As to Bolzano, one of the reasons why it seems that the same proposition 
is sometimes true and sometimes false in accordance with different times, 
places and objects, follows from the fact that we may look at some parts 
of it as variable. If we vary those parts, however, we do not have the 
‘same proposition’ changed, because variation on a proposition yields not 
the same, but another proposition than the original one. For instance it is 
not the case that the proposition 
(5) ‘This flower has a pleasant fragrance’ 
is sometimes true and sometimes false: we are faced with many 
propositions which are obtained by the same proposition if we consider 
certain parts of it as variable and we replace in it first one idea and then 
another (see Bolzano 1972, p. 194 [WL §147]).17 Bolzano gives some 
examples to explain the concept better. Consider the propositions  
                                                             
16 I write (b)-ity to stress that with b Bolzano means an idea of quality: he writes “A has 
b.” As regards the form “A has b-ity” as the primary form of truth-bearers in Bolzano, see 
Betti (1998b). 
17 The theory of variation (Veränderung) of ideas in a proposition is one of Bolzano’s 
most celebrate. See also §69 and §108 for the concept of variation of parts in ideas, which 
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(i) ‘The man Caius has mortality’ 
(ii) ‘The man Caius has omniscience’ 
(iii) ‘The being Caius has mortality’. 
If in (i) we consider the idea (part of (i)) ‘Caius’ as variable, the new 
propositions thus obtained are – for admissible substitutions – all true.18 
If we do the same in (ii), we obtain all false propositions, whatever we 
substitute for ‘Caius’. By repeating the procedure in (iii), we obtain 
propositions some of which are true and some of which are false. By 
these means, Bolzano introduces then the concept of the validity 
(Gültigkeit) of a proposition-in-itself,19 which is defined as “the concept 
of the relation of all true propositions to the total of all propositions 
which can be generated by treating certain ideas in a proposition as 
variables and replacing them with others according to a certain rule” 
(Bolzano 1972, p. 196 [WL §147]). 
3. Kazimierz Twardowski: On the So-Called Relative Truths (1900) 
and Actions and Products (1911) 
Many of the considerations already found in Bolzano on truth and time 
we find again in Twardowski’s Relative Truths. According to 
Twardowski when philosophers say that truth is relative relying on 
various examples of elliptical sentences, sentences with indexicals, 
sentences of general form, and sentences about ethical principles, they 
make a mistake. They confuse judgements as actions (czynno ci) 
(Twardowski 1900, p. 335 [Germ. transl., p. 446]) or mental products 
(wytwory) (Twardowski 1900, p. 317 [Germ. transl., p. 418]), with the 
sentences (powiedzenia) which express them. Therefore relativists 
replace erroneously the proper truth-bearer, the judgement, by the (type) 
                                                                                                                                     
is fundamental to extend the definitions of some relations among non-empty ideas to all 
ideas. See also Berg (1962), pp. 92 ff. 
18 In this case Bolzano restricts the substitution procedure to ideas referring 
(distributively) to men: ‘Gino’, ‘Wojciech’, ‘Franz’, etc. A proposition like ‘The man 
flower has mortality’ would be empty (i.e. has an empty subject, in Bolzano), and 
therefore false. See Bolzano 1972, p. 195 [WL §147]. 
19 See p. 393, below. Rolf George translates ‘Gültigkeit’ as ‘satisfiability’ (see Bolzano 
1972, p. 193), Burnham Terrell correctly as ‘validity’ (see Bolzano 1973 p. 187). 
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sentence.20 Yet sentences are only the external expression of judgements, 
and often they do not express all which the one who judges has in mind. 
Therefore: 
We can always convince ourselves very easily of the fact that the 
conditions placed by relativists are not satisfied, by integrating the 
sentences given by relativists in order that they become exhaustive 
expressions of judgements, and by freeing them from any ambiguity by 
means of an exact definition of the expressions contained in them. 
(Twardowski 1900, p. 323 [Germ. transl., p. 428]) 
For instance, if standing in Lvov on the castle mountain I claim that it is 
raining, “I have not in mind anyever rain falling in anyever place and at 
anyever time, but I utter a judgement on the rain falling here and now” 
(Twardowski 1900, p. 319 [Germ. transl., p. 421]). Relativists claim that 
a true sentence ‘it is raining’, may become false. But for Twardowski this 
is not the case. The sentence 
(6) ‘it is raining here and now’,  
when uttered on the 1st of March according to the Gregorian calendar at 
12.30 p.m. according to Central Europe time on the castle mountain in 
Lvov, contains the same judgement as  
(6*) ‘on the 1st of March according to the Gregorian calendar at 
12.30 p.m. according to Central Europe time on the castle 
mountain in Lvov it is raining’.  
The sentence 
(7) ‘it is raining here and now’, 
when uttered on the 1st of March according to the Gregorian calendar at 
4.00 p. m. according to Central Europe time on the castle mountain in 
Krakow, contains the same judgement as  
(7*) ‘on the 1st of March according to the Gregorian calendar at 
4.00 p.m. according to Central Europe time in Krakow on the 
castle mountain it is raining’. 
                                                             
20 Twardowski actually means type sentences, although not stating a distinction 
comparable to our  type/token one. Twardowski’s target is here mainly Franz Brentano. 
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According to Twardowski, (6) and (7) are the same sentence containing 
two different judgements, (6*) and (7*). Therefore it is not tenable that 
the same judgement goes from being true to being false: 
It is evident that [the judgement expressed by (6) and (6*)] which asserts 
in accordance with a real state of affairs (stan rzeczy) that it is raining, is 
not only true in a certain place and time, but always.21 (Twardowski 1900, 
p. 321 [Germ. transl., p. 424]) 
Thus the salient claim in Relative Truths, where by ‘truth’ Twardowski 
understands ‘true judgement’ (as Bolzano with Wahrheit an sich 
understands a true proposition-in-itself) (see Twardowski 1900, p. 315, 
the first five lines of p. 315 are omitted in the German translation) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
(TW) For any judgement g, if g is true at a time t, then it is true also at 
an arbitrary time t´ past or future with respect to t.22 
This can be easily applied also to falsity. Twardowski recognizes that 
between judgements and sentences there is a very precise link, but he 
denies that it is an identity relationship, just as a concept or a 
presentation is not identical with its external sign, the substantive (see 
Twardowski 1900, p. 317 [Germ. transl., p. 418]). Twardowski gives also 
a definition of truth for sentences: 
Now truth and erroneousness, considered as properties of a sentence, can 
themselves possess further properties, which they do not possess if they 
are considered to be in the proper and first sense properties of 
judgements. This further property [. . .] is exactly their relativity. Of 
sentences one can perfectly say that they are only relatively true. Yet the 
truth of a sentence depends on the fact that the judgement expressed by 
means of that sentence is true; nevertheless, since usually a given 
sentence can express some judgements which are partly true and partly 
false, it is relatively true because it expresses a true judgement only under 
a certain condition, i.e. if we consider it as an expression of a true 
judgement. (Twardowski 1900, p. 335 [Germ. transl., p. 446]) 
                                                             
21  The Polish word for ‘state of affairs’ translates the German ‘Sachverhalt’, even if the 
Polish-into-German translator of Relative Truths, Wartenberg, chose to write “[. . .] 
Urteil, welches in Ueberinstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit feststellt [. . .].” 
22 I modified in this way Wole ski’s (1990a) formulation (p. 191) where we find 
‘proposition’ in place of the Twardowskian ‘judgement’ (s d). 
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For Twardowski the relativity of the truth of a sentence is therefore a 
second-level property (property of property) which cannot be ascribed to 
truth as a property of judgements. An example of a relatively true 
sentence is “The father lives,” because – just as in Bolzano (see p. 375, 
above) – such a sentence is ambiguous and it may express either true or 
false judgements. This will depend on the person who utters or hears it 
(see Twardowski 1900, p. 335 [Germ. transl., p. 447]). According to 
Twardowski we have the same judgement when we have, “to say it in the 
language of traditional logic” (Twardowski 1900, p. 317),23 the same 
subject, predicate, quantity and quality, etc. of the judgement 
(Twardowski 1900, p. 317 [Germ. transl., p. 418)]. Note that Twardowski 
thinks of judgements as objects of a propositional structure.24 
 Twelve years divide Relative Truths from Actions and Products. The 
detailed examination that some considerable problems of interpretation in 
Actions and Products would deserve, chiefly on the concept of meaning 
(see Wole ski 1989, p. 41), will not be possible here. It is however 
possible to claim with a reasonably safe margin that in this work 
Twardowski revises the more psychologistic views of his On the Content 
and Object of Presentations (1894). In marking the line of demarcation 
between logic and psychology on the basis of the distinction act/product 
which underlies the theory of meaning, he proposes, Twardowski writes: 
And so the exact separation of products from acts has already decisively 
contributed to free logic from the influence of psychology. (Twardowski 
1911, p. 31 [§45])25 
 Twardowski’s mature theory of meaning is connected with the 
rigorous definition of the distinction between actions and products of the 
acts, which in 1900 were still interchangeable terms to denote 
judgements as mental objects (see p. 378, above). On the basis of a 
grammatical approach, Twardowski says that there is a basic distinction 
between physical, psychical (i.e. mental), and psychophysical acts and 
their products. The relationship between an act and what results from it is 
exemplified in the relationship between a verb and the corresponding 
                                                             
23 The sentence is omitted in the German translation. 
24 “[. . .] the term ‘subject’ may denote a term in the sentence, but also a concept in the 
judgement, and things are no different with the terms ‘predicate’ and ‘copula’,” 
(Twardowski 1900, p. 335 [Germ. transl., p. 446)]). 
25 Not translated in Pelc (1979). 
382 Arianna Betti 
substantive as internal complement (see Twardowski 1911, p. 6 [§8] 
[Engl transl., p. 15]): 
 Act Product 
Physical running run 
Mental judging judgement 
Psychophysical speaking speech 
Note that Bernard Bolzano is listed as one of the philosophers who have 
clearly separated actions and products (see Twardowski 1911, §10, p. 6, 
n. 2).26 A psychophysical product differs from a mental product by being 
perceptible to senses, from a physical product because in the 
corresponding action consciousness is involved. In some cases a 
psychophysical product becomes expression of a mental product, for 
instance a sentence is a psychophysical product which expresses a mental 
product, the judgement. The sentence in this case is the sign of the 
judgement, while the latter is the meaning of the sentence. According to 
Twardowski the term ‘judgement’ may have only four meanings: the act 
of uttering a judgement, the product of such an uttering, the disposition 
of uttering judgements and the enuntiatio or propositio or Aussage, of 
which he writes, referring to Relative Truths, “that in Polish I proposed 
to call sentence (powiedzenie)” (Twardowski 1911, §15, p. 10, n. 1 and 
n. 2 [Engl. transl., p. 25, n. 2 and n. 3]).27 The judgement exists in the 
period of time in which someone performs the corresponding act of 
judging, and, for this reason, is called a non-durable product (cf. 
Twardowski 1911, §23, p. 14 [Engl. transl., p. 17]). Products which last 
longer than the act which produces them are called durable products. In 
any case, a non-durable mental product like a judgement may be fixed in 
a durable psychophysical product. In this case such a fixing is not direct, 
but is the result of the fixing of an obligatory go-between, the verbal 
sentence (cf. Twardowski 1911, §37, p. 25 [Engl. transl., p. 22]), which 
is the non-durable psychophysical product fixed by the written sentence, 
that is, on the contrary, a durable psychophysical product. In this way the 
judgement, which is the meaning of the written sentence, “survives” in it 
(cf. Twardowski 1911, §33, p. 22 [Engl. transl., p. 20]), and has in it an 
                                                             
26 In the Polish original it is much more evident than in the English translation (p. 25, 
n. 1) that Twardowski ascribes to Bolzano a clear and correct position on the subject. 
Other philosophers quoted here by Twardowski are Bergmann, Meinong and Stumpf. 
27 The use of ‘judgement’ in this fourth sense is ascribed to ukasiewicz, see id., §44, 
p. 28, n. 1. 
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existence called potential. The fixed sign may at any moment cause the 
formation of an identical or similar judgement, and hence it lasts as long 
as a (partial) potential cause of it exists (cf. Twardowski 1911, §34, p. 23 
[Engl. transl., pp. 20-21]).28 
Non-durable products do not exist in the actual sense separately from the 
corresponding act, but only in connection with them; separately from the 
corresponding acts we may only examine them. (Twardowski 1911, §27, 
p. 18, n. 1 [not translated in Pelc (1979), my emphasis]) 
But, once they are fixed, judgements assume not only the appearance of 
durable products, but also of products which possess a certain degree of 
independence from the acts which produce them. Twardowski explains 
that this is due to the fact that we tend to attribute to the sign only one 
meaning, although it causes many judgements in many people. The 
unique meaning so conceived is no longer a mental product, but the set of 
the characteristics common both to all the individual judgements caused 
by the sign and to the judgement which belonged to whoever has fixed it 
in the sign. Twardowski makes it clear, in a fairly explicit manner, that 
he considered such sets to be (at least akin to) Husserl’s ideal meanings.29 
And the reference to Husserl and to his Logische Untersuchungen is 
obviously of great importance to us. Given the 10-year distance which 
divides Actions and Products from Husserl’s work one should not ascribe 
Twardowski’s anti-psychologistic turn exclusively to Husserl.30 However, 
in the rather chequered story of Twardowski’s anti-psychologism, 
Husserl surely played an influential role.31 Whatever relationship 
                                                             
28 Compare Bolzano: “An object [. . .] through whose idea we want to stimulate in a 
thinking being some other, associated, idea, is called a sign” (Bolzano 1973, §285, 
p. 308); cf. also Bolzano WL §285: “So the sight of those signs [of which the word ‘God’ 
is composed] will awaken at first only the idea of the word: God; but then also the idea of 
the object which this word denotes.” 
29 Cf. Twardowski (1911), §39, p. 26 n. 3 [Engl. transl., p. 26 n. 12]. The reference is to 
Logische Untersuchungen, II, p. 97. 
30 Twardowski is quoted in Husserl (1900-01), Third investigation, p. 287, but mainly 
Fourth Investigation p. 305 and Fifth Investigation pp. 527-528. In general, for the 
influence of Husserl upon Twardowski, see, for instance, Ingarden (1938). See also 
Wole ski (1989), p. 41 and my (2006). 
31 See for instance the long paper by Barry Smith, cf. Smith (1988), chiefly pp. 338-339. 
A certain influence may have been played by ukasiewicz’ anti-psychologism (cf. Jadacki 
1993, p. 191), who may be influenced by Husserl, cf. Simons (1996), p. 319. Cf. also 
Wole ski (1989), p. 41. See Schumann (1993) for further remarks on the Husserl-
Twardowski relationships. 
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Twardowski’s in specie meanings may have to Husserl’s ideal meanings, 
the introduction of this theme leads Twardowski to make a further 
distinction between substitutive (artefacta) and non-substitutive 
judgements. Substitutive judgements are those which are not real 
judgements, but fictitious ones. Twardowski applies the concept to logic: 
the sentences uttered or written by the logician are not sentences which 
express or have as meanings judgements which are really uttered by him, 
but only presented judgements, produced by different acts from actual 
judging acts. Such is the case of the logician who, to give examples of 
correct inferences, constructs a correct syllogism made up of false 
sentences (cf. Twardowski 1911, §44, p. 29 [Engl. transl., p. 24]). In this 
case the logician does not actually judge: “All triangles are square,” “All 
squares are round,” All triangles are round,” but only presents the 
corresponding judgements. The meanings of those sentences, judgments 
in the “objective” sense just described, as Twardowski says, which have 
the character of artefacta because they are only presented judgements, 
are the real subject-matter of logic (see Twardowski 1911, §44, p. 29).32 
Twardowski quotes Bolzano once more: 
The first person to argue this view of the object of logic in detail was 
Bernard Bolzano. He called the judgements that are rendered independent 
from the act of judgement in the way defined above ‘Sätze an sich’. 
Beside the ‘Sätze an sich’ Bolzano also knows the ‘Vorstellungen an 
sich’, that is presentations thus rendered independent from the act of 
presentation [Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, §§19-23 and §§48-53]. 
(Twardowski 1911, §44, p. 30, n. 1 (partial Engl. transl., p. 27, n. 16) 
Note that the ontological status of Bolzanian propositions-in-themselves 
is truly different from Twardowski’s judgements. For Bolzano a 
judgement is the acceptance (Fürwahrhalten) of a proposition-in-itself, 
while Twardowski’s act of judging is the production of judgements. 
Unlike Twardowski’s product-judgements, propositions-in-themselves 
are lektological objects, subsisting in the universe as a certain 
something, and they are not made independent, nor do they assume the 
appearance of independent objects. They are independent, not produced 
                                                             
32 The English translation of the paragraph 44, p. 23, lines 32-22 is incomprehensible: “A 
proposition (actually: judgement) as a product of the action of judging, i.e., of making 
judgements, is expressed in propositions (actually: sentences) [. . .]. Such sentences thus 
express propositions (actually: judgements), so that propositions (actually: judgements) 
are meanings of such propositions (actually: sentences),” and, unfortunately, it goes on 
like this (my emphases). 
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by acts, but rather contained in them as matter or content. They are not 
judgements abstracted from their psychological context, as seems to be 
the case in Twardowski. Yet one may think that Twardowski here is 
overcoming the ontological differences with Bolzano because he is much 
more interested in pointing out, first, that also Bolzano keeps the two 
spheres apart (acts/products in Twardowski), secondly that he postulates 
a difference between judging and the mere presenting of a judgement (or 
a proposition in Bolzano), as well (see Bolzano 1972, p. 43 [WL §34]; 
see also Casari 1985, p. 358). As regards Bolzano, such a difference is 
radical, because a judgement has as matter or content a proposition-in-
itself, which is a lektological object, always complex, enunciating (a) 
relationship(s) between objects, of which at least one is a quality. A 
presentation/subjective idea of a proposition, on the contrary, has as 
matter or content an idea-in-itself of such a proposition, which refers to 
that proposition. As regards Twardowski, things are more or less the 
same, if we adopt a Twardowskian terminology, changing relationship 
into state of affairs and so on, as in the following scheme (where I is the 
act level, II – the content/product level, III – the object level): 
 
Twardowski says very clearly that the act of presenting a judgement is a 
different act from the act of judging, and that their products are different 
(see Twardowski 1911, §44, p. 30, n. 1 [not translated in Pelc 1979]). 
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4. Stanis aw Le niewski: Is Truth only Eternal or is it both Eternal and 
Sempiternal? (1913) 
Le niewski’s fundamental thesis in (1913a) is that a true sentence – i.e. a 
truth as in Bolzano and in Twardowski – is true both eternally and 
sempiternally. Three elements are important in Le niewski’s paper: a 
clear formulation of the absoluteness of truth of Twardowskian and 
Bolzanian origin, transposed here in a nominalist key; the “discharge” of 
temporality from the verb to the predicate of sentences in a time different 
from the present, which is considered atemporal (as already seen in 
Bolzano); and the very remarkable distinction which today we claim is 
between tokens and types.33 
Le niewski’s conclusions are: everything which is past does not exist 
at present; it is not the case that objects accepted by an affirmative 
sentence s exists only when s is true, and, conversely, it is not the case 
that s is true only when the object accepted by it exists; every truth is 
eternal and sempiternal; from the circumstance that we cannot create 
truth does not follow that we cannot create anything, as the sempiternity 
of truth does not make free creativity superfluous. To prove the eternity 
and sempiternity of truth Le niewski assumes strong ontological and 
semantical premises, which reduce the proofs to rather trivial exercises.34 
Le niewski assumes the logical principle of contradiction and the 
principle of bivalence – which turns out here to be a special case of the 
ontological tertium non datur – consequently denying the existence of 
sentences which are neither true nor false (see Le niewski 1913b, §8, 
Remark I, pp. 350-351 [Engl. transl., pp. 83-85]). Moreover, Le niewski 
assumes that it is always possible to de-indexicalize indexical sentences 
(of which temporal indexes are a special case) (see p. 388, below). 
Le niewski’s (1913a) allows to add further elements to the theory of 
truth already drawn up in his previous papers (see Le niewski 1912, 
§§5-16, Remark II, pp. 212-217 [Engl. transl., pp. 31-37] and Le niewski 
1913c).35 For Le niewski a sentence s is a concrete linguistic object (with 
meaning!), and as such it has an existence with definite spatio-temporal 
boundaries. Since an object a may possess a property b if and only if it is 
present, then that special object which is a sentence may be true only 
when it is present, that is only in such a case may it symbolize a relation 
                                                             
33 The issue is present in Le niewski (1913b), too. 
34 However, there is nothing fallacious in them, contra Wole ski (1993), p. 193. 
35 For Le niewski’s early semantics, see my papers quoted in the bibliography. 
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of inherence. Therefore in Le niewski’s universe truth-bearers are 
present objects made of concrete signs or sounds. To the question of how 
to give a meaning to the expression ‘eternal truth’ in such a perspective, 
Le niewski answers saying that the eternity at issue is metaphorical, just 
as two sentences uttered respectively today and tomorrow are the ‘same 
sentences’ only in a metaphorical sense. Hence 
(8) For any time t, the sentence ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ could be 
true at t if someone uttered it, wrote it, etc. in t. (Cf. Le niewski 
1913a, p. 506 [Engl. transl., p. 97].) 
The claim that ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ is eternally true should be 
understood according to (8). Le niewski’s remarks on the meaning to be 
attributed to the expression ‘to be the same sentence as s’ are linked to 
the token/type distinction already mentioned. Le niewski was to use in 
his formal systems the expression ‘expression equiform to s’ to denote 
what is now generally called “a token of s.” I use here the token/type 
distinction for sake of simplicity, but Le niewski’s choice avoids the 
ontological problems which arise with the token/type terminology. For 
Le niewski, a type would be a very undesirable general object. Here 
below are summed up the conditions which a sentence of the form “a is 
b” must satisfy to be true according to Le niewski: 
L1 a is denotative; 
L2 b is connotative; 
L3 The object (objects) denoted by a possesses (possess) the 
properties connoted by b. 
To L1-L2 one should add (or, better, put before), in the light of what has 
been said above, a condition of availability of truth-bearers, so one has 
(L) For any sentence “a is b” and any time t, if “a is b” is uttered, 
written, etc. at t, “a is b” is true at t if and only if the conditions 
L1, L2, L3 are satisfied. 
And therefore the eternity and sempiternity of truth may be re-formulated 
as follows: 
(L*) For any sentence s, if s is true at a time t, then is also true any 
sentence equiform to s uttered, written, etc., at an arbitrary time t´ 
past or future with respect to t. 
In one word, in Le niewski truth is omnitemporal: if s is true, any 
time a sentence s´ equiform to s is expressed, s´ is true. The relation of 
inherence that a sentence symbolizes exists independently from the 
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moment in which the sentence is uttered. As was the case in Bolzano, the 
structure “a is b” is canonically a tenseless structure. For Le niewski the 
present tense in which the copula is expressed does not denote a present 
subsisting of the relation symbolized by the sentence “a is b,” but it is 
used as a substitute for a tenseless form which grammars do not 
contemplate. Consider now the trasformation of an expression in subject-
predicate form uttered (written, etc.) at t: 
(9) (a was/will be b) uttered at t  (a is b in a past/future time with 
respect to t) 
(with b not already expressing or involving a temporal property). The 
future/past time indicated by ‘will be’/‘was’ is attached salva 
significatione to b in the sentence in canonical form on the right, where t 
is the moment in which the sentence on the left is uttered. The need to 
regard ‘is’ as a tenseless sign follows from the fact that not every 
sentence expresses a temporal property: temporal properties are on the 
whole similar to any other property, and they may be predicated or not.36 
Otherwise we would have the paradoxical consequence of getting from 
the sentence “In June nights are short” uttered in January the nonsensical 
“In June nights are short in January” (see Le niewski 1913a, §4, pp. 512-
513 [Engl. transl., pp. 101-102]). For Le niewski any sentence with 
indexicals like ‘I’, ‘my’, ‘he’ and so on, of which temporal 
determinations are special cases, are to be de-indexicalized in a similar 
fashion as (9) (see Le niewski 1913a, §4, p. 509 [Engl. transl., p. 99]). 
Consider now the examples: 
(i) “Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C.” uttered in 1996 
(ii) “Caesar will cross the Rubicon in 49 B.C.” uttered in 55 B.C. 
(iii) “Caesar will cross the Rubicon” uttered in 1913 
(iv) “Caesar will cross the Rubicon” uttered in 55 B.C. 
Their transformations are: 
(i*) (Caesar is crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C.), uttered in 1996 
                                                             
36 Unlike Wole ski (1990a), p. 193, I have chosen to put the temporal index on b instead 
of putting it on the subject: Le niewski, unlike Bolzano, does not consider time to be a 
determination which is not a property; rather he takes the time to be a property just like 
any other property. I would keep the temporal index on the subject for Le niewski’s 
mature four-dimensional ontology in which (presumably) time-slices appear. See my 
Logic and Existence in Stanis aw Le niewski (in Italian) MA thesis, University of 
Florence, 1994/5, chap. iv. On this point see also Smith (1990), §9, pp. 160 ff. 
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(ii*) (Caesar is crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C.), uttered in 55 B.C. 
(iii*) (Caesar is crossing the Rubicon in a future time with respect to 
1913), uttered in 1913 
(iv*) (Caesar is crossing the Rubicon in a future time with respect to 
55 B.C.), uttered in 55 B.C. 
 The sentences (i*)-(iv*) are different expressions uttered in different 
times: (i*)-(ii*) are equiform (i.e. they are the “same” sentence in a 
metaphorical sense), whereas (iii*)-(iv*) are non-equiform (they are not 
the “same” sentence, not even in a metaphorical sense). In the sentences 
(i)-(ii) it is not important when they are uttered, while in (iii)-(iv) the 
moment of utterance is a piece of information which must be 
supplemented in the transformed sentences (iii*)-(iv*), which are 
respectively false and true. Consequently, Le niewski denies that the 
“same” sentence from true (iv*) becomes false (iii*). The two sentences 
(iii)-(iv) are apparently equiform but semantically different sentences, 
one being true and the other false, and symbolizing different relations of 
inherence, i.e. R(ab)>55 B.C. and R(ab)>1913, where a stands for ‘Caesar’ 
and b for ‘crossing the Rubicon’.37 Now take the sentence (i*): it 
symbolizes the relation R(ab)49 B.C.. The situation may be presented 
schematically as follows:  
                                                             
37 I write ‘R(ab)>t’ for ‘R(ab)-which-is-a-future-object-with-respect to-t’, etc. The index 
here should not be seen as a part of the relationship asserted by ‘a is b’. We can look at it 
as a linguistic means to express a semantic-procedural indication as for ‘where in time’ 
we have to look for R(ab), like in Scheme 1. 






In 49 B.C. Caesar crosses the Rubicon. The tokens 1-4 of the true 
sentence “Caesar is crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C” all symbolize the 
relation R(ab)49 B.C., but are expressed at different times, hence 
R(ab)49 B.C. is a future object with respect to tokens 1 and 2 while it is a 
past object with respect to tokens 3 and 4. That the truth of “a is b” is 
eternal and sempiternal “metaphorically” (8) means that it is supposed 
that along the temporal line, beginning from a moment t, a token of “a is 
b” is expressed at any t´ such as t  t´ (eternity) and at any t˝ such as 
t˝  t (sempiternity). Thus the transformations at (9) are to guarantee the 
(metaphorical) eternity and sempiternity of truth, that is it makes it 
possible to treat all sentences as if they were of the form “a is b at t,” in 
this case “Caesar is crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C.” True transformed 
sentences of the form “a is b at t” symbolize in any case an object R(ab)t, 
and the fact that the latter is past, present or future with respect to the 
moment in which “a is b at t” is uttered does not have any influence on 
the truth of the token-sentence. 
R ( a, b) 49 B. C. 
Token1 ‘a is b in 49 B.C.’ Token2 ‘a is b in 49 B.C.’ Token3 ‘a is b in 49 B.C.’ Token4 ‘a is b in 49 B.C.’ 
49 B.C. 55 B.C. 1996 
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5. Historical Remarks 
According to Barry Smith, Twardowski’s view of scientific disciplines in 
Actions and Products in terms of the durable products of judging acts 
“finds echoes in Le niewski’s view of his own logical systems as 
collections of concretely existing marks” (Smith 1988, p. 345). Yet 
Twardowski’s view, simply because the theory of meaning which 
nourishes it, does not seem to be so near to the nominalism of 
Le niewski’s systems, the origins of which can be more easily discerned 
in Le niewski’s own earlier works (see Betti 1998a). On the contrary 
Twardowski’s conception might appear as multiplicatio entium sine 
necessitate for a nominalist, for apparently it adds to the act, the product 
and the object, also the meaning in specie as abstract product (see Brandl 
1998, p. 30). One may rather wonder whether Twardowski’s concept of 
the judgement as non-durable product, which lasts as long as the action 
of judging lasts, might have had an influence on Le niewski’s position 
regarding truth-bearers as non-durable concrete objects. Such a 
hypothesis may seem convincing in the light of passages like the 
following in Twardowski: 
Also of some convictions we actually say that they remain for several 
centuries, and of the thoughts of the wise that they may outlive him. 
However, what is at issue here is not the actual durable existence of 
products, but rather the fact that similar actions and products are repeated 
for many generations [. . .]. Likewise, we say that there are in us 
concepts, convictions, desires, even if at a given moment the 
corresponding acts do not occur in us. This means only – as is well 
known – that there are in us dispositions due to which in the future may 
occur in us products which are just like the previous ones. So if we speak 
of the durable existence of products of this kind, what is in question is the 
repetition of identical actions and products or their potential existence. 
(Twardowski 1911, §23, pp. 14-15 [the English translation in Pelc omits 
the footnote]) 
The same holds for the footnote that follows the words quoted above: 
This potentiality can be grasped [. . .] if for instance it the “existence” of 
truths which no one knows yet is spoken about, that is of the “existence” 
of true judgements which no-one has uttered. Of course what is at issue 
here is the possibility of uttering such judgements, and what exists are not 
the judgements, but the possibility of uttering them. (Twardowski 1911, 
p. 15, n. 1 [the English translation in Pelc omits the footnote]) 
Nevertheless, at least two remarks should be made.  
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1) Twardowski’s position is not clear. If one considers the case of logic, 
it seems we can reasonably exclude that in Twardowski truth-bearers are 
token judgements. Even in Relative Truths, although Twardowski says 
that only judgements, mental expressed acts/products, may be true, his 
definition of ‘being the same judgement’ could make us doubt that he is 
thinking of token judgements. In spite of the fact that Twardowski in 
Actions and Products discusses the expression ‘to be the same’, saying  
for example that, if we say that the ‘same thing’ happened to two 
persons, what is interesting in this case is the characteristics common to 
the two events, “because “the same” cannot take place twice” 
(Twardowski 1911, §39, p. 26, n. 1 [not translated in Pelc 1979]), the 
object of logic are, however, the judgements which are rendered 
independent from the acts which produce them. Whether or not that are 
meanings similar to ideal objects in Husserl’s sense,38 according to 
Le niewski they would be general objects, objects that have all the 
characteristics common to the individual objects with respect to which 
they are general. One need not remark how much Le niewski disagreed 
with these positions, which he explicitly polemicized against more than 
once (see Le niewski 1913c, §3, Remark V, pp. 140-142; Le niewski 
1913b, §1, Remark II, pp. 318-320 [Engl. transl., pp. 50-53]). 
2) Another point to be noticed which weakens the hypothesis of 
Twardowski’s influence on the development of Le niewksi’s nominalism 
regards the possibility of fixing a judgement as a non-durable mental 
product in a durable psychophysical product (sentence). For Le niewski, 
Twardowski’s fixing of truth-bearers would not guarantee at all – either 
temporarily, or “apparently” – a change in ontological status: in 
Twardowski’s terminology, we would not be fixing anything, because 
signs, too, are non-durable products; concerning the judgement39 uttered 
yesterday which today is not present and which therefore cannot be true, 
Le niewski writes: 
I say in my text “I utter a judgement;” if, however, someone would prefer 
that the “judgements” were “written,” or even “proved,” “felt” or “lived” 
                                                             
38 A negative answer is favoured by Brandl (1998) and Smith (1989). But it seems only 
Buczy ska-Garewicz (1980) discusses to any extent the matter. She argues for a rather 
radical dissimilarity. Though leaving the issue aside here, I incline rather towards the 
opposite view. 
39 I warn the reader that in Le niewski (1913a) Le niewski uses ‘judgement’ only to 
adhere to Kotarbi ski’s terminology. We should understand ‘sentence’ any time 
Le niewski writes ‘judgement’. 
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– this would not have any influence on the result of my argumentations. 
(Le niewski 1913a, 3, p. 503, n. 1 [Engl. transl., p. 95])40 
The influence that Actions and Products may have played on Le niewski 
did not regard, I believe, his nominalism, be it the nominalism of his 
post-1920 logical systems or his nominalistic take on the ontological 
status of truth-bearers in this period. Twardowski’s work could have 
instead influenced the transition from Le niewski’s 1911 Marty-style 
theory of truth to his 1912-1913 theory (cf. Betti 1998a) in a negative 
sense, that is, he might have caused Le niewski’s reactions against 
Twardowski’s notion of meaning, and driven him to abandon judgment-
contents as truth-makers in 1911. At the same time it may have driven 
Le niewski to compare his ideas on truth and theory of meaning with 
Bolzano’s or with Bolzano-oriented views. Moreover, in Actions and 
Products Twardowski speaks highly of Bolzano: 
With the enucleation and the employment of the concepts of ‘Sätze an 
sich’ and ‘Vorstellungen an sich’ Bolzano surpassed significantly the 
logicians contemporary to him, as he did with the introduction of the 
concept of the logical variable and (using the name of Gültigkeit) of the 
concept of logical value [sic] that play such a great role in modern 
symbolic logic. Among other matters Bolzano uses these concepts to set 
up logical relationships and to define the concept of probability. 
(Twardowski 1911, p. 30, n. 1 [this part of the footnote is not translated 
in Pelc 1979])41 
This quotation immediately reminds one of the concept of variation of 
ideas in Bolzano’s propositions-in-themselves mentioned above. 
Twardowski calls the concept of Gültigkeit “the concept of logical 
value,” which Jan ukasiewicz, Twardowski’s pupil and Le niewski’s 
colleague, was to call in Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlich-
keitsrechnung (1913) more properly “the logical concept of validity of a 
proposition.” In §24 “Bolzano’s concept of validity,” ukasiewicz says 
that Bolzano was 
an [. . .] author whose works have at present acquired great importance, 
as they well deserve, and who developed opinions that come quite close 
to mine. ( ukasiewicz 1913, §24, p. 52) 
                                                             
40 Therefore, in opposition to what Smith seems to suggest, written sentences are not 
durable at all for Le niewski, nor are matters different in his formal systems. 
41 Twardowski writes warto  (value) where ukasiewicz, speaking of the same concept, 
writes wa no  (validity). Cf. ukasiewicz (1913), §24, p. 52, n. 20. 
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In the note that follows, ukasiewicz writes: 
For the reference to Bolzano I am indebted to Professor Twardowski; 
although Bolzano’s principal work [i.e. Wissenschaftslehre, ab] was long 
known to me, I had previously paid no attention to his remarks on the 
concept of the ‘validity’ of a sentence. ( ukasiewicz 1913, §24, p. 52, 
n. 20) 
Then ukasiewicz goes on to comment Bolzano’s examples, dedicating 
many pages to the difference between his own concept of logical value 
and Bolzano’s concept of validity.  
6. Three Sempiternities of Truth 
The similarity of Bolzano, Twardowski and Le niewski’s positions is 
undoubtedly a very close one. If we consider, however, the difference in 
the objects which play the role of truth-bearers, Le niewski’s nominalist 
position on sempiternity (L*), called here omnitemporal, turns out to be 
certainly different from those of Bolzano’s and Twardowski’s (B), (TW), 
which I would call atemporal. By combining Twardowski’s positions in 
Relative Truths and in Actions and Products, we obtain a sufficiently 
systematic picture that may be used to compare his views with those of 
the others. However we may interpret Twardowski’s abstract meanings, 
they have ontological features which do not sit well with Bolzano’s 
platonistic absolutism. Twardowski’s absolutism, I would say, may be 
labelled “Aristotelian,” the term being suggested by the characteristics of 
meanings which are the object of logic, artefacta-judgements/in specie 
meanings. Hence we have propositions-in-themselves (lektological 
beings) in Bolzano, judgements (species inferred by abstraction) in 
Twardowski and concrete occurrences of sounds uttered (or of signs 
written) at different times in Le niewski. For Le niewski, as already 
seen, neither type sentences nor the “judgements” that a sentence 
expresses (be they tokens or types), but only token expressions may fulfil 
such a function. It is not enough for two sentences to have the same 
truth-maker to be “the same sentence,” they would be so only in a 
metaphorical sense. For Le niewski there is no “judgement” as the 
meaning of a sentence s. Tthe solution he gives to the problem of the 
ontological status of his truth-bearers allows him to keep a wholly 
consistent position regarding the sempiternity of truth. His position is 
different from Bolzano’s and Twardowski’s, since it is an original 
interpretation of sempiternalism in a nominalistic vein. 
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7. Created Truth? 
As said above, Le niewski’s Is Truth . . . was a reply to Kotarbi ski’s 
The Problem of the Existence of the Future. In it Kotarbi ski claims that 
all truths are eternal, while only some of them are sempiternal (see 
Kotarbi ski 1913). This means that: 
(a) judgements (in Kotarbi ski’s terminology) which are true at a time 
t are also true at every time t´ such that t < t´ (eternity). 
But this does not mean that: 
(b) all of them are likewise true at every time t˝ such that t˝ > t 
(sempiternity).  
(a) and (b) apply to judgements false at a time t, too. Kotarbi ski’s 
definition of a true judgement is the following: 
(K) A judgement g which accepts an object P is true at t if and only if 
P exists at t. 
For Kotarbi ski, non-sempiternal truths are those regarding events in 
which free human creativity plays a fundamental role. Suppose that P is 
an object created by a human action; P does not exist until t´, the time at 
which it is created; if g is the judgement which accepts P, g is not true 
until t´. But if g is false, that g is false is eternally true (a), and it would 
not be possible to create P. But since we supposed that it was possible to 
create P in t´, in a time t such that t < t´, g must be neither true nor false. 
Kotarbi ski’s real premise appears to be the principle that the 
creation of the object R(ab) involves the creation of the truth of “a is b” 
(and vice versa). Such an assumption is similar to the so-called “bridge-
principle” which Morscher points out when writing on Marty’s theory of 
truth. Marty infers temporality of judgements starting from the 
temporality of the objects which the judgements refer to.42 Now a 
question arises. Since for Le niewski the availability of a token of “a is 
b” is a necessary condition for this token to be true, should we say that he 
introduces a ‘creative’ element in his theory of truth, given that the truth-
                                                             
42 I am not able to justify the possible hypothesis of Marty’s influence on Kotarbi ski in 
that period, and most of all of the possible role of Marty’s doctrine of irrealia which go in 
and out of time: Kotarbi ski had suggested the reading of Marty’s Untersuchungen, but 
this happened in 1920 (from Jan Wole ski’s letter of 26.1.1996). For Marty’s theory of 
truth, see Morscher (1990). 
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bearer must be present and therefore created? Actually the token may 
possess any property, truth included, only starting from the moment it is 
created. Therefore it seems we need to understand ‘creating a truth’ in 
another, modified, sense, which Le niewski does not discuss thoroughly. 
As to Le niewski, one can say that s is true continuously only in a 
metaphorical sense, as previously observed, because a true sentence is an 
object with a determined spatio-temporal dimension: there is not one 
sentence s uttered many times, but many true sentences equiform to s as 
uttered. But then, one may say, if truth-bearers must be created, they 
must be created together with their truth. As a matter of fact, (see scheme 
1) truth as a property of the token2 (truth2) is by no means truth as a 
property of the token3 (truth3): truth, for Le niewski, is a relationship 
between a sentence and an object, called symbolic relation, and “to be 
true” for a sentence, is to have (in Le niewski’s terminology) symbolic 
function, the property of symbolizing something. Truth2 is a relation 
between the token2 and the object R(ab), whereas truth3 is a different 
relation between the token3 and the same object R(ab). Therefore, truth is 
only metaphorically uncreated, just as truth is metaphorically eternal and 
sempiternal. But one can also invoke a definition of ‘created truth’ 
according to which creating a truth would mean in Le niewskian terms to 
deny the claim (L*). Hence it would mean to have the token pt come out 
false, but the token pt  true (see Le niewski 1913a, 4, p. 506 [Engl. 
transl., p. 97]). When we create pt , we cannot make it possess the 
property of truth if pt was or will be false. Thus it follows that what we 
really cannot create in such a situation is a token pt  with symbolic 
function. The truth (symbolic function) of the truth-bearer “a is b” is to 
be brought back to the existence of the relation of inherence between the 
object a and the property b with a definite spatio-temporal dimension. 
Coming back to the example of Caesar and the Rubicon of the scheme 1, 
what one cannot do is create a token5 which does not symbolize 
R(ab)49 B.C.. The creation of the object R(ab) is therefore an act which is 
completely independent of the creation of a token of “a is b.” The object 
R(ab) remains also the sole object independent of the creation of a token 
of “a is b” and its truth: neither the symbolic function (property of 
tokens) nor the symbolic relation (between tokens and truth-makers) are, 
properly speaking, independent of the time of utterance (contra Wole ski 
1990a, p. 196). 
Thus in Le niewski the truth of a sentence and the objectivity and 
omnitemporality of that truth depend in a very strong sense uniquely on 
the existence of the truth-maker of the sentence. On the contrary, one 
could say that in Bolzano the existence of the truth-maker guarantees the 
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truth of a proposition, but objectivity and atemporality seem guaranteed 
rather by the ontological status (objective and atemporal) of the truth-
bearer as can be deduced from the argument that when it is said that a 
proposition is relatively true, what is actually meant by ‘proposition’ is 
the (elliptical) linguistic sentence which expresses the proposition-in-
itself. The same seems to apply also to Twardowski. 
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